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Abstract
Many popular psychological accounts attribute adaptive human behavior to an ‘executive 
control’ system that regulates a lower-level ‘impulsive’ or ‘associative’ system. However, 
recent findings argue against this strictly hierarchical view. Instead, control of impulsive and 
inappropriate actions depends on an interplay between multiple basic cognitive processes. 
The outcome of these processes can be biased in advance. Action control is also strongly 
influenced by personal experiences in the recent and distant past. Thus, executive control 
emerges from an interactive and competitive network. Main challenges for future research 
are to describe and understand these interactions, and to put executive action control in a 
wider socio-cultural and evolutional context.
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Scientists and non-scientists alike have always shown great interest in how the human mind 
regulates behavior (Verbruggen, Chambers, & McLaren, 2014). This goes back to the 
Ancient philosophers and writers (e.g. Confucius, Plato, Ovid,...). Psychologists typically 
attribute adaptive behavior to an executive system, which can override impulsive or 
inappropriate actions, allowing people to fulfill long-term goals. In contemporary Western 
societies, executive control (or a lack of it), has been linked to physical and mental health 
outcomes, school and job success, substance (ab)use, and personal finances (Moffitt et al., 
2009). Furthermore, the idea that people have voluntary control over their impulses and 
actions permeates our current social systems (Logan, 2003). Thus, executive control is 
critical in everyday life. Nevertheless, this aspect of human functioning has proven to be one 
of the most difficult issues to tackle.
In this paper, I will provide a general and selective review of research on executive 
control of actions (for in-depth discussions and detailed overviews, see the Recommended 
Reading list). I will primarily focus on stopping of inappropriate or impulsive actions (i.e. 
‘response inhibition’). Stopping is generally considered a simple but extreme act of executive 
control, and has proven to be an excellent case study. 
Mechanisms of Executive Action Control
Historically, control of impulsive or inappropriate actions was attributed to an intentional and 
rational ‘executive control’ system that regulated a lower-level automatic and emotionally-
charged system. However, recent findings suggest that this strictly hierarchical view is 
incorrect. Instead, action control seems to emerge from a highly interactive network with no 
clear boundaries between ‘higher-level’ and ‘lower-level’ systems. Nevertheless, the 
traditional dual-systems accounts still prevail in the wider literature. 
How to Control Impulsive or Inappropriate Actions 
In the last two decades, great efforts have been made to fractionate the executive controller 
into distinct control functions (e.g. Miyake et al., 2000). But too often researchers label 
operations as ‘executive’ without further questioning the nature of the underlying processes. 
Consequently, they often fail to explain how behavior is regulated in complex environments. 
Progress on the control problem requires a more precise approach.
Researchers should focus on the building blocks of action control. It is generally 
accepted that acting or responding to a stimulus involves different processing stages (e.g. 
Sternberg, 1969). Similarly, action control in response to changes in the environment or 
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internal state involves a chain of basic processes that results in the inhibition of a response 
and the activation of an alternative one (Verbruggen, Chambers, et al., 2014). For example, 
the first step of various forms of action control, such as stopping, involves detecting relevant 
information that signals the need for control; these signals can be external (e.g. a red traffic 
light) or internal (e.g. a sudden thought or conflict between various response options). Next, 
an appropriate action (e.g. stop) needs to be selected or retrieved from memory. Finally, the 
selected action (e.g. press the brake pedal) has to be executed quickly but accurately.
These basic control processes are inherently competitive and interactive. The 
competition idea receives support from behavioral, neuroscience and computational studies. 
For example, when neural activity associated with one visual stimulus increases, activity 
associated with other concurrent stimuli decreases (Duncan, 2006). This could also explain 
why people find it difficult to attend to more than one stimulus or do more than one thing at 
the same time. The interactive idea receives support from recent studies, including from my 
own lab. A prominent model of response inhibition and executive control, the independent 
race model, assumes that executive-control processes (stop) and lower-level processes (go) 
are independent (Logan & Cowan, 1984). However, we found strong dependence between 
go and stop processes when task difficulty was manipulated (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). 
Other studies have also observed brief moments of interaction in easier response-inhibition 
tasks (e.g. Boucher, Logan, Palmeri, & Schall, 2007). Thus, action control seems to emerge 
from a competitive and interactive network, rather than from an independent top-down 
control system that oversees and alters ongoing processing in lower-level systems. 
Bias and Anticipatory Control
Often people must find a delicate balance between competing task demands. Focusing on a 
single stimulus could lead to overly rigid behavior while the constant reorienting of attention 
could lead to constant distraction. Similarly, responding quickly in the currently relevant task 
(e.g. driving home) can lead to fast task completion, but reduces the likelihood that an action 
can be stopped or replaced in response to unexpected changes in the environment (e.g. a 
child crossing the street).
Such a balance can be achieved by biasing stimulus or response competition in 
advance. For example, when the organism predicts the occurrence of a stimulus (e.g. based 
on previous experiences or external cues, such as a traffic warning sign), it can strategically 
pre-activate the relevant visual cells, biasing neural competition in favor of the expected 
stimulus (e.g. Duncan, 2006). Similarly, when it predicts certain actions, it can pre-activate 
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the motor network, biasing action selection and reducing the response latency of the 
anticipated action (e.g. Bestmann, 2012). 
The biasing idea can account for a range of phenomena in the control literature. For 
example, we proposed a general biasing account for proactive inhibitory control (Elchlepp, 
Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016). When subjects are informed that they may have to 
stop a response in the near future, they typically slow down (Aron, 2011; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009a). Our results indicated that proactive inhibitory control works by biasing or 
altering (neural) activity in systems that are involved in stimulus detection, action selection, 
and action execution. For example, subjects monitored for perceptual features of the stop 
signal in stop contexts. They also traded speed in the go task for success in the stop task. 
These findings are consistent with work in the wider attention and executive-control literature 
(see Elchlepp et al., 2016, for a discussion). Furthermore, we found that subjects made 
similar proactive-control adjustments in a task in which they occasionally had to execute an 
additional response (instead of stopping a response). We also observed an overlap between 
proactive inhibitory control and proactive control in task-switching studies (i.e. preparation for 
upcoming tasks; for reviews on task switching, see Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, 
Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). These findings led us to conclude that all forms of 
proactive control require reconfiguration or biasing of task settings (e.g. which stimulus to 
attend to, which response to execute, etc.). Thus, the most important difference between 
tasks or contexts is which processing systems are adjusted, rather than the adjustment 
mechanisms (Elchlepp et al., in 2016; for a similar argument, see Logan, Van Zandt, 
Verbruggen, & Wagenmakers, 2014).
When attention is proactively allocated and responses are prepared, behavior may not 
require much control anymore; instead, responses could be activated easily by stimuli in the 
environment (Meiran, Cole, & Braver, 2012). Indeed, response inhibition can be triggered by 
task-irrelevant primes (e.g. van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b), but these priming effects are primarily observed in contexts in 
which subjects are instructed to stop occasionally (Chiu & Aron, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009b). These findings are consistent with the ‘prepared reflex’ idea: once subjects have 
made proactive-control adjustments in anticipation of a stop signal, the ‘stop response’ can 
be activated easily by both task-relevant and task-irrelevant information in the environment.
Control across time and space 6
Influences of the Recent Past
Performance monitoring is a critical component of action control (Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & 
Jocham, 2014). For example, people often slow down after they make an error. This slowing 
is usually attributed to the executive system: when it detects an error or suboptimal outcome, 
it adjusts the parameters of lower-level systems to reduce the likelihood of future errors. 
Thus, errors or suboptimal outcomes can signal the need for extra control. Consistent with 
this idea, subjects often slow down after an unsuccessful stop. However, slowing has been 
observed after successful stopping as well. This led Bissett and Logan (2012) to conclude 
that stop-signal presentation encourages subjects to shift priority from the go task to the stop 
task (i.e. they bias competition). Such a shift produces longer response latencies after a 
signal trial and can reduce the latency of the stop process. 
Recent events can influence actions in other ways as well. When people perform an 
action, they store information about the stimulus, the task, the selected action, and possibly, 
the control settings, in memory (Egner, 2014; Logan, 1988). When the stimulus is repeated, 
this information is retrieved. This could explain why people are often slower to respond to a 
stimulus that was previously presented in a different task context or that was paired with 
another response or with stopping. 
Another source of sequential effects is residual activation in perceptual or motor systems. 
For example, we found that excitability of the motor system was associated with the 
response properties of the previous experimental trial (Verbruggen, McAndrew, Weidemann, 
Stevens, & McLaren, in press). In competitive systems, small activation differences at the 
beginning of a trial could make the difference between a response being selected or not. The 
same study showed that previous events influenced actions even if this went against 
conscious expectancies about upcoming events. Proactively biasing response options is 
effortful (Braver, 2012). Thus, even though people can predict what will happen next, they 
may not always adjust their behavior accordingly. This could explain why recent events can 
influence our behavior, even when this is inappropriate.
Learning and Development at the Heart of Executive Control 
A main control function is biasing activity based on rules, expectancies, or task goals. But 
how does the system know which options or processing pathways to bias? Some progress 
has been made in answering this question. For example, Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, 
and O’Reilly (2005) developed a neurologically inspired model of rule learning and control. 
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The model was trained to respond to multidimensional stimuli. In each block, only one 
dimension was relevant (e.g., color), but the specific features within the dimension could 
change (e.g., red, green, yellow). Throughout the block, the prefrontal cortex system 
developed patterns of activity that encoded abstract representations of the relevant stimulus 
dimension (e.g., “color”). These abstract rule-like representations subsequently guided 
behavior by providing excitatory support for the relevant dimension in the stimulus-
processing layers; in other words, they biased competition. This was possible because links 
between the abstract representations and the processing layers were built during training 
(note that a similar principle could explain how stimuli, cues, or task contexts can become 
associated with control settings; see above).
Other work indicates that acquired representations (and the links between the 
representations and processing layers) can be reused with a variety of other 
representations; furthermore, they can be re-applied in different contexts (Cole, Laurent, & 
Stocco, 2013). This could explain people’s ability to rapidly learn new action rules from 
instructions and show adaptive behavior in novel situations. 
But learning also influences performance in a slightly different way. Our work suggests 
that executive control of impulsive and inappropriate actions can become progressively more 
‘automatic’ throughout practice (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). In a series of studies, we have 
demonstrated that people learn to associate specific stimuli with different aspects of 
stopping (for a discussion of what is learned, see Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & 
McLaren, 2014). When the stimulus is repeated, these associations are retrieved, and the 
stop network is activated automatically. This work is theoretically relevant because it shows 
that ‘executive’ functions, such as response inhibition, can become automatized. It also has 
practical implications. Recent meta-analyses indicate that stimulus-specific stop training can 
influence food and alcohol consumption (e.g. Jones et al., 2016). Thus, outsourcing control 
to the environment may help people regulate their actions.
Integrating the learning and control literatures may also provide new insights into the 
development of executive control. The ability of children to control their actions improves 
remarkably from infancy through adolescence to adulthood. Several key transitions have 
been identified, such as from ‘reactive’ to ‘proactive’ control1, from externally-driven to self-
1 Some have argued that when people age, control shifts again from ‘proactive control’ to ‘reactive 
control’; this shift may account for age-related differences between young and older adults in a variety 
of executive-control tasks (Braver, 2012). 
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directed control, and from stimulus-driven to rule-based behavior (Munakata, Snyder, & 
Chatham, 2012). The work discussed above indicates how children can go from 
implementing specific stimulus-response associations to general rules: children may 
gradually develop abstract representations through constant interaction with their 
environment, and associate these with relevant behavior (i.e. they may learn that similar 
objects or situations require a similar response). Such abstract representations can 
subsequently guide or contextualize stimulus detection, action selection, and action 
execution. 
Interim Conclusions 
The work reviewed above indicates that control of impulsive or inappropriate actions 
involves a chain of processes that occur on different time scales. Researchers should 
explore at which of the processing stages situational, individual, or group differences arise. 
Furthermore, there is no clear distinction between ‘controlled’ (or ‘goal-directed’) and 
‘automatic’ processes. For example, automatic processes can be goal-directed and are 
influenced by task context (Ridderinkhof, 2014), whereas the prepared reflex and associated 
learning work shows that some ‘control’ processes (such as stopping) can operate in a 
(semi-)automatic way. Finally, research (not reviewed here) suggests that emotion and 
motivational processes can have a strong influence on executive control (e.g. Braver et al., 
2014). Combined, these findings indicate that action control arises from a highly interactive 
network with multiple components and influences, rather than from two separate systems 
that operate in parallel. 
Future Directions and Challenges
A main challenge for future research is to describe how executive control emerges from an 
interactive and competitive network. Furthermore, it remains unclear how individuals build up 
a control repertoire throughout development and what is learned when people control their 
actions. Finally, models of control assume that processing is biased based on rules or (task) 
goals. But how are these rules or goals selected? In the case of externally driven control, the 
answer is usually straightforward (e.g. a parent giving instructions). For internally driven 
control, the answer is less obvious, although some progress has been made in tackling this 
issue (Ridderinkhof, 2014). Ultimately, progress on the control problem will require 
addressing fundamental questions about the nature of volition and intentionality.
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Significant progress in understanding executive control will also require new models that 
integrate different disciplines and literatures. For example, society dictates what behavior is 
acceptable and what should be inhibited (e.g. taboos2 or drug consumption). It also 
determines how we define and deal with (perceived) impulse-control problems (e.g. 
regulation, medicalization, or criminalization). These definitions and the rules that govern our 
behavior have developed and changed throughout history. Thus, executive action control is 
strongly influenced by socio-cultural factors. Executive control is also shaped by genetic 
evolution. Different species (e.g. birds, lemurs, & monkeys) can perform tasks in which they 
have to suppress inappropriate actions, indicating that executive control has evolved across 
species (MacLean et al., 2014). This finding undermines the traditional belief that executive 
control is a uniquely human trait that distinguishes us from ‘impulsive’ animals. However, we 
don’t have a coherent account of the bio-evolution of executive control yet. Therefore, we 
also have to study differences across time, space, and species, and explore the origin and 
consequences of such variations.
Conclusion
I propose that executive control of actions arises from a chain of interactive and competitive 
processes. Furthermore, I argue that executive control is strongly influenced by events in the 
past, by the broader context in which the individual operates, and by bio-cultural evolution. 
Thus, new models will have to go beyond a singular focus on the individual as well as 
beyond social or biological determinism. Only when we understand the interaction between 
individuals and their environment, we can have a really satisfactory theory of executive 
control. 
2 Neuroimaging findings suggest that taboo words activate parts of the neural network that is involved 
in cancelling actions when external signals are presented (Severens, Kühn, Hartsuiker, & Brass, 
2011)
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